Monday 8 May, 4.30 pm, Sala Enzo Paci (via Festa del Perdono, 7)

Neil Sinhababu (Singapore): Experientialism about Moral Concepts

I present an experientialist account of moral concepts, on which moral judgments are beliefs about when moral feelings represent objective facts. For example, guilt represents wrong actions while admiration represents virtuous character. Experientialism is suggested by an elegant empirical model of moral psychology. It fits into a cognitivist, externalist, and Humean picture of moral judgment, providing an alternative to views that analyze moral concepts in terms of reasons. It also provides new support for ethical hedonism.


Tuesday 16 May, 2.30 PM, Biblioteca di Politeia (via Festa del Perdono, 7)

Riccardo Viale (University of Milano-Bicocca): 'Embodied ecological rationality'

Ecological Rationality (introduced by the group of Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Todd  and colleagues at Max Planck Institute  for Human Development in Berlin) is the well known attempt to develop empirically the prescriptive side of bounded rationality model  in heuristic decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Contrary to the main stream of behavioral economics (whose main interest is the comparison of human decision making with normative rational models) its focus is on the structure of the environment and on the relative successful adaptive behaviour. Few neurocognitive studies have been realized to explain the neural mechanism of the adaptive  success of heuristic decision making. My hypothesis is that the Embodied Cognition approach and in particular the models of embodied perception and emotion might give some cues for understanding the intuitive features of  Recognition Based and One-Reason Based heuristics in particular the  Take-the-First and Take-the-Best heuristics.

Wednesday May 31 - Thursday June 1, 2017 (SALA ENZO PACI, Via Festa del Perdono, 7)


The scientific debate of individual cognition and its relation to (mental) action and society has a long tradition. More recently, philosophers and cognitive scientists have approached the peculiarities of cognition in groups, addressing questions like: What is ‘cognition in groups’? Is there something like a ‘group mind’ or ‘socially extended mind’? What is special about being engaged in mental actions in a group together with other agents opposed to being engaged in the same kinds of action individually? What does mental action and mental agency come to in groups? What is the interrelation between group cognition and social ontology? To which extent does the existence of institutions and social facts depend on cognition in groups? This workshop aims at continuing the debate by addressing questions like these and shedding new light on ‘cognition in groups’ from various angels.


  • Laura Candiotto (University of Edinburgh)
  • Natalia Danilkina (University of Groningen)
  • Angelica Kaufmann (University of Göttingen)
  • Kourken Michaelian (University of Dunedin)
  • Christoph Michel (University of Regensburg)
  • Giulia Piredda (IUSS Center for Neurocognition, Epistemology and Theoretical Syntax in Pavia)
  • Alejandro Rosas (National University of Columbia)
  • David Strohmaier (University of Sheffield)
  • Giuliano Torrengo (University of Milan)
  • Tillmann Vierkant (University of Edinburgh)

For information about the full program and abstracts, please use the link "workshops" above.