Thursday 24 May, 2018 2.30-4.00 PM (via Festa del Perdono 7, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Aula Paci)
Ophelia Deroy (Faculty of Philosophy, and Munich Center for Neuroscience, LMU, Munich)
Abstract: According to predictive models, perception is a hierarchical and predictive process: instead of sensory signals being processed in a bottom-up fashion, they are compared to inner predictions at different levels of processing. Many, such as Andy Clark but also Friston, Frith, or Lupyan, point out that such a model “makes the lines between perception and cognition fuzzy. In place of any real distinction between perception and belief we now get variable differences in the mixture of top-down and bottom-up influences". This, in turn, has been taken to imply that perception is through and through cognitively penetrated, or that the very idea of 'cognitive penetration' ceases to be relevant. Here, i will argue that these diagnoses comes from looking in the wrong place: focusing on our recent work on top-down influences in face perception, I will suggest that the perception/cognition divide still needs to be drawn, even if one adopts predictive models of the effects, because of two distinctive characters of cognition.
Thursday 26 April, 2018 2.30-4.00 PM (via Festa del Perdono 7, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Aula Paci)
Pierre Jacob (Jean Nicod, Paris): "How to Solve the Developmental Puzzle"
Abstract: Most preschoolers have been shown to fail explicit false-belief tasks where they are directly asked to predict the action of a mistaken agent. However, findings based on implicit false-belief tasks show that preverbal infants expect an agent to act in accordance with the content of her belief (whether true or false). How to reconcile these discrepant findings? This is the developmental puzzle about false-belief understanding. There are two broad approaches to this puzzle, according to whether or not one accepts a mentalistic interpretation of the infant data. I will criticize non-mentalistic deflationary approaches to the infant data and advocate a pragmatic account of why most preschoolers fail explicit false-belief tasks.
Thursday 12 April, 2018, 2.30-4.00 PM (via Festa del Perdono 7, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Saletta Seminari Sottotetto)
Cyril Hédoin (Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne): "Practical Reasoning, Rule-Following and Belief Revision: An Account in Terms of Jeffrey's Rule”
Abstract: This paper provides a conceptual exploration of the implication of Jeffrey’s rule of belief revision to account for rule-following behavior in a game-theoretic framework. Jeffrey’s rule reflects the fact that in many cases learning something new does not imply that one has full assurance about the true content of the information. In other words, the same information may be both perceived and interpreted in several different ways. In the context of strategic interactions, this implies first that to follow a rule, agents must frame the interaction in a sufficiently similar way and be aware of the same salient properties, i.e. they must have the same partition of the event. Second, they must ascribe to others the same revised probabilities to what they take to be the common partition. In a game-theoretic framework, this also implies that rule-following behavior cannot be identified merely with the existence of a common prior.
Monday 9 October, 2017, 4.30-6.00 PM
Andrea Scarantino (Georgia State University): "Could emotional expressions have been building blocks for language evolution?"